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Nephi Slaying Laban Illegal and Proof of Fraud in Book of Mormon?

Research by Kerry A. Shirts

Br Clif’s website at

http://www.iahushua.com/eoeic/thebook.htm

has many questions about the Book of Mormon. Some are interesting, some are silly. Since he labels them between one * and four ****’s, I thought I’d take one of his very toughest questions, the ones with a four star rating, which he calls "testimony killers" and discuss it. I find perfectly reasonable and obvious explanations in Br. Clif’s questions. First, I present Br. Clif's argument (in bold type), then my response.

****32. Alma 55:18,19; 1 Nephi 4:7-30--If "Moroni" did not slay the "Lamanites" in their drunkenness because he did not delight in murder or bloodshed, can we then say that "Nephi" killed "Laban" because he did delight in murder and bloodshed? I think we can. I knew of a number of people[at most two, and now I can only remember the identity of one of them] investigating the Mormon Church who had big problems with the slaying of "Laban" in his unconscious state. Also, where did all of the blood go which must have come from the beheading of "Laban"? Apparently, it did not spill onto the armor or clothing which "Nephi" donned or "Zoram" would have noticed it. Maybe the author of The Book of Mormon forgot about this small, but gory, detail.

I think this is a fascinating story for more reasons than Br. Clif brings up. He hasn’t looked at it in near the detail as other scholars have. John Welch’s article "Legal Perspectives on the Slaying of Laban," in the "Journal of Book of Mormon Studies is simply masterful at examining this idea. One idea he discussed is worth repeating here:

(Journal of Book of Mormon Studies: Legal Perspectives on the Slaying of Laban, p.124)

1. Nephi's state of mind. The basic facts regarding Nephi's state of mind in this case are well known. He entered Jerusalem late one night, probably unarmed, hoping to obtain the plates of brass. He did not know beforehand what he should do. He stumbled onto Laban drunk in the street. He was constrained repeatedly by the spirit of the Lord to kill Laban, and eventually he cut off Laban's head with his own sword. In killing Laban, Nephi sought no revenge, but acted reluctantly, without hatred, and in good faith.

It is evident that the ancient concept of premeditation (if we may use such a term) was different from the concept of premeditation under modern American or British law. The modern concept merely requires awareness and determination, and such determination need not have been formulated any earlier than the instant at which it is given effect. The archaic concept of premeditation, however, required a murder to have been preplanned, thought out, schemed, or implemented through some kind of treachery, ambush, sabotage, or lying in wait. "Lying in wait" is the term employed to describe the wily tactics of a hunter stalking his prey (as in Genesis 10:9; 25:27-28; 27:3, 5, 7, 33); and the word "presumptuously" expresses "insolent defiance of law."[ See Mayer Sulzberger, "The Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide," Jewish Quarterly Review 5 (1914-15): 127-61, 289-344, 559-614, esp. 290-91, citing Deuteronomy 17:12-13; 18:20, 22; Isaiah 13:11.] Thus, Bernard Jackson has concluded: "Premeditation [in biblical law] means that the action in question was the result of a preconceived design, not of a desire formed on the spur of the moment. Thus, not every intentional act is premeditated."[ Jackson, Essays, 91; see also 154-55. On the meaning of human intentionality, and its theological connection in Jewish thought with conforming to the divine will, see Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Human Will in Judaism: The Mishnah's Philosophy of Intention (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986); reviewed by Bernard S. Jackson, in Jewish Quarterly Review 81 (1990): 179-88.]

Several strong clues indicate that Nephi had the ancient definition in mind when he wrote the story of Laban. He trusted implicitly that the Lord in some miraculous unknown way would be "able . . . to destroy Laban," even as he had vanquished the Egyptians at the Red Sea (1 Nephi 4:3). He expressly emphasized the fact that he did not know what he was to do as he entered the city of Jerusalem: "I was led by the Spirit, not knowing beforehand the things which I should do" (1 Nephi 4:6). This point is crucial, for it shows that Nephi had not planned to find Laban and that he did not know that Laban would be out with the city elders, where Laban would be, or that he would be drunk. The occasion presented itself spontaneously. Nephi was completely surprised to find Laban. His deed was not preplanned and, therefore, not culpable.

I thought that most interesting and a much more careful analysis and fuller explanation than what Br. Clif has given us. Consider Welch’s further ideas:

(Journal of Book of Mormon Studies: Legal Perspectives on the Slaying of Laban, p.126)

Evidently for this further reason, Nephi certified in some detail that he had no desire to kill Laban and that he did not do the deed of out malice because of any of Laban's offenses against him and his family. Nephi reasoned with himself, "I also knew that he had sought to take away mine own life; yea, and he would not hearken unto the commandments of the Lord; and he also had taken away our property" (1 Nephi 4:11), but he recognized that none of these rationalizations would justify the slaying of Laban either at law or before the justice of God. He resisted the distasteful assignment, saying in his heart, "Never at any time have I shed the blood of a man" (1 Nephi 4:10). He did not act out of hatred or enmity, although the meaning of the later term is somewhat unclear. It has been argued that the ancient concept of enmity ('êbah) went well beyond personal hatred and was a technical term that requires "a different kind of antipathy than that which arises in the daily course of human events." Stanley N. Rosenbaum, "Israelite Homicide Law and the Term 'Enmity' in Genesis 3:15," <EL>IT+>Journal of Law and Religion 2 (1984): 149. Rosenbaum suggests that this rare Hebrew term originally referred to a state of belligerency that had been declared by a head of state against an enemy of the people and that such a conflict can "only be resolved by the death of one of them," ibid., 148-49. With respect to Genesis 3:15, Rosenbaum suggests that God acted like such a king in declaring "enmity" between Satan and the seed of Adam and Eve, for "the real fruit of [Satan's] deception which took place in Eden was murder," ibid., 150, and this conflict will not be resolved until either Satan or the king is dead. His theory implies that only God or the king as the divine representative can rightfully declare such a state of enmity, and he infers that the royal power to declare 'êbah had been perverted by individuals in antiquity and thus "the purpose of the legislation [in Numbers 35:21-22] was to prevent individuals from declaring 'êbah against one another," ibid., 151. This observation, if correct, would bear on the slaying of Laban, for it was indeed God­-and not Nephi­-who declared such a state of enmity against Laban. When Laban was killed by Nephi it was not under any kind of prohibited enmity that he as an individual had arrogated to himself the power to declare.

Welch also explores the meaning of the term murder and the ideas of killing from both the ancient Hebrew and ancient Greek Septuagint scriptures and demonstrates how Nephi in the Book of Mormon would not have been guilty of murder:

(Journal of Book of Mormon Studies: Legal Perspectives on the Slaying of Laban, p.127f)

In addition, Numbers 35:11, 15, and Joshua 20:3, 9, which seem to require that the killing occur "at unawares," should not be understood to limit the ability of a person in Nephi's situation to flee to a city of refuge and seek exculpation simply because he had been conscious of his action at the time it took place. The Hebrew word translated "unawares" is shegagah. Meaning "to sin ignorantly," this word also occurs in Numbers 15:28 (compare Mosiah 3:11). It derives from the word shag'ag', meaning to stray, sin, miss the mark, be deceived, or err, but not necessarily unconsciously. Depending on how these words are construed, they may imply that the person acted perhaps negligently but at least unaware of the consequences of his action, or that he miscalculated or misjudged. Others in Jerusalem might have judged Nephi to have acted in error,[ For an interesting discussion of the ancient legal and literary treatments of tragic errors as opposed to morally insignificant accidents, see David Daube, "Error and Accident in the Bible," Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité 2 (1949): 189-213. Daube, 209, concludes that no law developed distinguishing between error and accident because "it is exceedingly difficult to mark off from any irrelevant error that sort and degree of error which you want to consider as exonerating a man."] and ancient legal distinctions may have existed between various kinds of mistakes (i.e., ignorance of the law, mistakes of fact, misjudgments of consequences, etc.), but no one could have doubted that if Nephi sinned he did so unaware of it being a sin and acted in good faith. Gauging by later Jewish law, which may shed a little further light on the subject, "a murder by someone under the mistaken belief that his actions were permissible" was considered grossly negligent, but the slayer was not subject to punishment;[ Eliash, "Negligent Homicide in Jewish Criminal Law," 88, citing Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Nezikin 6:10.] at least, it has been argued, he "should be treated less severely than one who kills another in ignorance of the more fundamental command not to kill."[ Arnold Enker, "Mistake of Law and Ignorance of Law in Jewish Criminal Law," 2, summary of paper for the Conference of the Jewish Law Association, Paris, July 1992, full paper forthcoming in the Jewish Law Annual.] Thus, Nephi's action would probably have come within the additional protection of wrongs committed "unawares," if it were viewed as a wrongdoing to any extent.

The foregoing conclusion, based on an examination of the Hebrew terminology, is confirmed on other grounds by the Greek word that was used in the Septuagint to translate shegagah in Numbers 15:28. The Greek word is akousios, a contracted form of aekousios, literally meaning "unwillingly." Its root is hekousios, from hekon, denoting action that is "voluntary, willing, acting of free will," within one's control; and thus its opposite, akousios, is action that is "against the will, constrained,"[ Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), 27, 53, 514-15, 749-50.] "intended but not desired."[ W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), 153.] This term was used as a legal term by Antipho, Plato, and Aristotle to refer to "involuntary action," including such actions as "involuntary murder" or jettisoning the cargo of a ship in order to save the vessel and its passengers. Obviously, its meaning was broader than the English word involuntary.[ Antipho, II, 2, 6; see generally, Aristotle, Ethics III, 1, 8-9.] Aristotle recognizes that many difficult philosophical questions are raised by "actions done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble object," and he concludes that these "mixed" actions approximate voluntary conduct at the time they are committed; but his main interest is not juristic and thus he does not pursue or resolve the issue. Aristotle's discussion, however, shows that the issue was a live one in the ancient world: where an action was truly undesired by the human agent, it certainly could be argued that it was equivalent to involuntary conduct for purposes of assessing legal culpability so long as the circumstances were meritorious.[ The entire third book of the Nicomachean Ethics wrestles with the problems of classifying an action as voluntary (hekousia), involuntary (akousia), or mixed (mikte). See Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, 152-59.]

Such concepts coming from the Greek world only a few centuries after the time of Nephi offer a valuable point of comparison in assessing Nephi's state of mind. Nephi says, "And I shrunk and would that I might not slay him" (1 Nephi 4:10). This affirms that Nephi's action was strongly against his will and his desire, and hence was involuntary under either the Hebrew or Greek conceptions. Moreover he states that he was "constrained by the Spirit that I should kill Laban" (1 Nephi 4:10). "Constrain" was a strong English word in Joseph Smith's day, meaning "to compel or force; to urge with irresistible power, or with a power sufficient to produce the effect" and "to produce in opposition to nature."[ Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Converse, 1828).] Being "constrained," Nephi should not be viewed as acting willingly according to his predilections, but obedient to a higher authority to achieve the lesser of two evils. Thus Nephi concludes this section of his account by saying, "And now when I, Nephi, had heard these words, . . . I did obey the voice of the Spirit" (1 Nephi 4:14, 18). Accordingly, Numbers 15:28; 35:11, 15; and Joshua 20:3, 9 would have encompassed Nephi's action legally within the concept of "involuntary" conduct and would not have taken him outside the principles of asylum or of mitigated culpability.

Welch makes another point that most critics as well as innocent Mormons usually missed and at worse, misunderstand, Br. Clif being in the latter category I feel.

(Journal of Book of Mormon Studies: Legal Perspectives on the Slaying of Laban, p.131-136)

2. God's deliverance of Laban into Nephi's hand. In the end, Laban was killed for one and only one reason, namely because the Spirit of the Lord commanded it and constrained Nephi to slay him, for "the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands" (1 Nephi 4:11, 12; see also 1 Nephi 3:29). Looking beyond Nephi's personal state of mind on the matter, the ultimate reason for his action was God's deliverance of Laban into Nephi's hands. As the Spirit stated, it was the Lord who caused Laban's death: "the Lord slayeth the wicked to bring forth his righteous purposes" (1 Nephi 4:13). And, parenthetically, the distinctive biblical punishment for inveterate, unrepentant apostates was execution by the sword (Deuteronomy 13:15).

The killing of Laban was not the only time in ancient Israel when God sanctioned certain slayings to promote the national existence and welfare of the righteous. During the conquest of the Promised Land, Israel was commanded to kill the inhabitants of the region in order to occupy that land and to establish Israel, and accordingly Jewish law recognizes a special legal classification of certain mandatory wars required when God commands.[ For further details, see my "Law and War in the Book of Mormon," in Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin, eds., Warfare in the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and F.A.R.M.S., 1990), 49.] The wars of the kings were optional and limited, but the requirements imposed by God in certain circumstances were mandatory.[ George Horowitz, The Spirit of Jewish Law (New York: Bloch, 1953), 147-48.]

Some people have wondered why God needed to have Nephi kill Laban instead of telling him simply to put on Laban's clothes and go forth in disguise to get the plates. Leaving the drunken Laban alive, however, would probably have created serious problems in several ways: (1) Laban could have awakened, stumbled home, or could have been helped home by someone else who found him drunk in the streets; if Laban had reentered his house while Nephi was there pretending to be Laban, Nephi would have been extremely vulnerable as a housebreaker at night. (2) Even if Laban spent the night in the streets, the next morning he would have regained his senses and would have been furious. He would have led a search party to pursue and kill Nephi and his brothers and recover the plates of brass. With Laban dead, however, his family and kinsmen would have gone into mourning and would have immediately attended to the funeral and burial. They were less motivated to recover the plates than Laban would have been (especially since they had already inherited Lehi's gold and silver from Laban). (3) Few members of Laban's family were probably much aware of the negotiations and conflicts between Laban and the four sons of Lehi. With Zoram gone, people in Jerusalem could well have assumed that Zoram was the one who had killed Laban, since the city of Jerusalem had every reason to believe that the four sons of Lehi had been scared out of town earlier and had never returned. If Laban had not been killed, however, he would have known Zoram and the circumstances well enough to have suspected what had happened and to have led an effective pursuit against Nephi and his brothers. These reasons explain why it was virtually essential to the completion of Nephi's task that Laban be killed, and with a little imagination several other reasons can probably be suggested.

Be that as it may, Laban was not killed for any short-term practical need of the moment. As Nephi stood marveling over the drunken Laban, he must have been quite astonished. He was drawn immediately to Laban's sword, which he removed from its sheath. The splendor of the workmanship and the sharpness of the steel blade left an indelible impression on the young man's mind. As Nephi stood marveling at this weapon, the Spirit constrained Nephi that he should kill Laban (1 Nephi 4:10). Nephi balked. The Spirit then said to him again, "Behold the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands" (1 Nephi 4:11). Three times Nephi tried to rationalize the commanded deed, but the Spirit said again, "Slay him, for the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands" (1 Nephi 4:12).

The words of the Spirit were apparently a verbatim quote from Exodus 21:13, "And if a man lie not in wait, but God deliver him into his hand." These words or their equivalent, in my opinion, would have been recognized by Nephi as coming from the Code of the Covenant. Growing up in Israel as a young boy, Nephi would certainly have learned this passage from Exodus 21. Deuteronomy 6:6-7 required righteous parents in Israel to teach their children the law of Moses, to talk of these words when they sat at the dinner table, to recite them as they walked down the path, to repeat them before going to bed, and to speak of them upon rising in the morning. One of the most important texts of the law of Moses was Exodus 21-23, essentially an elaboration of the familiar Ten Commandments. Coming early in the first chapter of the Covenant Code was the text cited by the Spirit to Nephi.

The Hebrew verb in Exodus 21:13 translated as "deliver" ('innah) occurs only four times in the Hebrew Bible. Mayer Sulzberger sees in this phrase a "subtle intimation that Divine wisdom" causes events to occur "between persons not hostile to each other, in order to attain ends of justice which the narrow wisdom of human courts would be unable to reach."[ Sulzberger, "The Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide," 292.] Accordingly, this rare Hebrew expression or its equivalent indicated to Nephi in essence that God had caused Laban and Nephi to meet that night,[ The Hebrew may be translated, "God [ha-Elohîm] caused him to meet," Jackson, Essays, 91 n. 98; but this expression is otherwise unattested and thus its meaning is not entirely certain. Eliash renders this phrase, "and the Lord caused it to come [by] his hand," see "Negligent Homicide in Jewish Criminal Law," 69. Paul Hoskisson has suggested in private correspondence, 2 June 1981, that the Hebrew should be understood to mean that "God has caused the opportunity to come upon him," namely the one killed. The Greek Septuagint translators three centuries after Nephi rendered these Hebrew words alla ho theos paredoken eis tas cheiras autou, literally "but God delivered [him] into his hands." Despite the possible translational nuances here, the message should have been clear to Nephi in any case: God had caused him to stumble onto Laban, or had caused this outcome to come upon Laban, or had delivered Laban into his hands.] and that Laban's death was occasioned by an act of God, but not as that term is understood in its modern sense.[ God's involvement for purposes of Exodus 21:13 should not be confused anachronistically with the modern legal notion of "act of God," which has come to mean "an act occasioned exclusively by violence of nature without the interference of any human agency." Black's Law Dictionary, rev. 4th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 1968), 43.] Especially if the Spirit used this rare word and not one of the more common Hebrew words for "deliver" (for example, natan, "to give over"; or hissîl, "to snatch, rescue"), the connection between the Spirit's words and Exodus 21 would have been far more obvious in Hebrew than it is even in English.

The implication of the Spirit's instruction could not have been lost on Nephi: he had not been lying in wait and the Lord had delivered Laban into his hands. Therefore, in order to accomplish the Lord's purposes, under this unusual and extraordinary circumstance, the killing was on both counts legally justifiable and religiously excusable. It was the kind of killing that would be protected by the mercy of God in a place of refuge within God's jurisdiction.

Better that one man perish than a whole nation. The Spirit, finally, gave the following explanation for Laban's death: "It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief" (1 Nephi 4:13). This point of view concerning the relative rights of the individual or the group also has a long tradition in biblical and Jewish legal history.

The Old Testament lays a narrative groundwork for the legal view that, under rare appropriate circumstances, a single person can be exposed to certain death for the benefit of the whole. David Daube has shown that in early Israel there was little moral constraint protecting the individual in such a case:

Clearly, no such scruples are entertained by the Judeans in Judges [15:9-13] who, fearing what their mighty Philistine neighbours might do to settle accounts with the indomitable Samson, propose to deliver him up in fetters.[ David Daube, Appeasement or Resistance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 79.]

And the case of Sheba, a rebel against King David in 2 Samuel 20, provided a further instance where peace was offered to an entire city in exchange for the life of a single man (2 Samuel 20:21-22).

This point of law, along with its biblical precedents and ethics, was hotly debated between the Pharisees and Sadducees at the time of Christ: The initial position of the Pharisees was "unbendingly negative: no one to be surrendered ever, even though extinction will ensue," while the Sadducees (notably Caiaphas in condemning Jesus) were more liberal (John 11:50; 18:14). Eventually the view of the Sadducees prevailed, as evidenced in the Genesis Rabba: "It is better to kill that man [Ullah] so that they may not punish the congregation on his account."[ Genesis Rabba 94 on 46.26, cited in ibid., 87.] In the rabbinic period, Talmudic law went on to puzzle deeply over the meaning and implications of these notions. Used judiciously, these debates confirm the fact that surrendering one person to be killed for the benefit of the entire group was a topic addressed in biblical law.

In the Talmud, unpremeditated homicide was eventually subdivided into five categories: negligent, accidental, nearly avoidable, under duress, or justifiable.[ Elon, Principles of Jewish Law, 476.] For purposes of comparison with Nephi's case, justifiable killings included (1) those that prevented one man from killing another (and by analogy, Nephi's slaying of Laban prevented him from causing Lehi's people to perish spiritually) and (2) surrendering a specific named individual to be killed when heathens threaten to kill a whole group unless that one is delivered up. While the rabbis passionately and compassionately debated the limited circumstances under which the life of a specified individual could be sacrificed for the benefit of the group,[ See TY Terumot 8:10, 46b, in The Talmud of the Land of Israel: A Preliminary Translation and Explanation, Alan J. Avery-Peck, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 6:418, which reads:

It is taught [T. Ter. 7:20]: [As to] a group of men who were walking along and gentiles met them and said, "Give us one of your number that we may kill him, and if not, lo, we will kill all of you"­-let them kill all of them, but let them not give over to them a single Israelite. But if they singled one out, such as they singled out Sheba the son of Bichri [2 Sam. 20]­-let them give him to them, that they not all be killed. Said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "Now this applies [only] if the man [already] is subject to execution, as was Sheba the son of Bichri." But R. Yohanan says, "[It applies] even if he is not subject to execution, as was Sheba the son of Bichri."

Similarly, it was permitted for a group of women to turn over one who was unclean to be raped in order to protect the cleanness of the others. Ibid. While it was allowed to sacrifice the welfare of one for the whole, the rabbis taught that "the law for pious ones" advised against doing so. Ibid., 419. Others held that the person singled out for death had to have "already forfeited his life to God by committing a capital offense against God's laws for which he had not yet been punished," although this opinion was not held unanimously. Haim H. Cohn, Human Rights in Jewish Law (New York: KTAV, 1984), 38.] and whereas one case from the fourth century A.D. distinguished between an individual and a group ordered to put a man to death (the individual must first offer himself to be killed),[ David Daube, Collaboration with Tyranny in Rabbinic Law (London: Oxford, 1965), 26-27.] there can be little doubt that the possibility of killing one person for the benefit of the whole was recognized under early Jewish law and that it was consonant with the rationale expressly stated in Laban's case ("better that one man should perish than a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief," 1 Nephi 4:13).

Indeed, logic was on the side of the rabbis who held that this rule applied especially when the victim had already committed a crime worthy of death, and this raises the further possibility that Laban was justifiably consigned to die because he had committed such a crime. Falsely accusing a person of a capital offense was a capital crime under biblical law (Deuteronomy 19:19), as it had been in the ancient Near East since at least the time of Hammurabi (Code of Hammurabi 1). Since Laban had falsely accused Laman of being a "robber" (a serious capital offense)[ Bernard S. Jackson, Theft in Early Jewish Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 13; against robbers "the laws of war operated," 16. I thank Paul Hoskisson for recently reminding me of this point which we had discussed several years ago. It is also probable that Laban was among those who had wrongly accused Lehi of being a false prophet, which was also a capital offense (Deuteronomy 13:5; 18:20).] and had sent his soldiers to execute the sons of Lehi on this pretext (1 Nephi 3:13, 25), Laban effectively stood as a false accuser. Such an accusation, coming from a commanding officer of the city, was more than an idle insult; it carried the force of a legal indictment. Since Nephi and his brothers were powerless to rectify that wrong, God was left to discharge justice against Laban.

I believe these examinations and explanations are exquisitely exciting as we need to keep in mind that the Book of Mormon is an ancient book. Welch is not the only one who has analyzed this episode in the Book of Mormon however. Hugh Nibley also has indicated that the Book of Mormon correctly depicts this situation as it could have occurred anciently:

(Collected Works of Hugh Nibley, Vol.5, Part.1, Ch.5, p.99 - p.100-104)

With great reluctance, but urged persistently by "the voice of the Spirit" (1 Nephi 4:18), Nephi took Laban's own sword and cut off his head with it. This episode is viewed with horror and incredulity by people who recently approved and applauded the far less merciful slaughter of far more innocent men on the islands of the Pacific. Samual ibn Adiyt, the most famous Jewish poet of Arabia in ancient times, won undying fame in the East by allowing his son to be cruelly put to death before his eyes rather than give up some costly armor which had been entrusted to his care by a friend. The story, true or not, is a reminder that eastern and western standards are not the same, and that the callousness of Americans in many matters of personal relationships would shock Arabs far more than anything they do shocks us. The Book of Mormon is no more than the Bible confined to mild and pleasant episodes; it is for the most part a sad and grievous tale of human folly. No one seems more disturbed by the demise of Laban, however, than Nephi himself, who takes great pains to explain his position (1 Nephi 4:10-18). First he was "constrained by the Spirit" to kill Laban, but he said in his heart that he had never shed human blood and became sick at the thought: "I shrunk and would that I might not slay him" (1 Nephi 4:10). The Spirit spoke again, and to its promptings Nephi adds his own reasons: "I also knew that he had sought to take away mine own life; yea, and he would not hearken unto the commandments of the Lord; and he also had taken away our property" (1 Nephi 4:11). But this was still not enough; the Spirit spoke again, explaining the Lord's reasons and assuring Nephi that he would be in the right; to which Nephi appends yet more arguments of his own, remembering the promise that his people would prosper only by keeping the commandments of the Lord, "and I also thought that they could not keep the commandments . . . save they should have the law" (1 Nephi 4:15), which the dangerous and criminal Laban alone kept them from having. "And again, I knew that the Lord had delivered Laban into my hands for this cause. . . . Therefore I did obey the voice of the Spirit" (1 Nephi 4:17-18).

At long last Nephi finally did the deed, of which he is careful to clear himself, putting the responsibility for the whole thing on the Lord. If the Book of Mormon were a work of fiction, nothing would be easier than to have Laban already dead when Nephi found him or simply to omit an episode which obviously distressed the writer quite as much as it does the reader, though the slaying of Laban is no more reprehensible than was the beheading of the unconscious Goliath.

From time to time the claim is put forth, that the story of Laban's death is absurd, if not impossible. It is said that Nephi could not have killed Laban and made his escape. Those who are familiar with night patroling in wartime, however, will see in Nephi's tale a convincing and realistic account. In the first place, the higher critics are apparently not aware that the lighting of city streets, except for festivals, is a blessing unknown to ages other than our own. Hundreds of passages might be cited from ancient writers, classical and Oriental, to show that in times gone by the streets of even the biggest towns were perfectly dark at night, and very dangerous. To move about late at night without lamp bearers and armed guards was to risk almost certain assault. In the famous trial of Alcibiades for the mutilation of the Hermes, we have the testimony of one witness who, all alone, beheld by moonlight the midnight depredations of a drunken band in the heart of downtown Athens, from which it is clear that the streets of the greatest city in the western world were unlighted, deserted, and dangerous at night. In times of social unrest the streets at night were virtually given over to the underworld, as they were in some European cities during the blackouts of the late war. The extreme narrowness of ancient streets made their blackout doubly effective. From the Greek and Roman comedy and from the poets we learn how heavily barred and closely guarded the doors of private houses had to be at night, and archaeology has shown us eastern cities in which apparently not a single house window opened onto the public street, as few do even today at ground level. East and West, the inmates simply shut themselves in at night as if in a besieged fortress. Even in Shakespeare's day we see the comical terror of the night watch passing through the streets at hours when all honest people are behind doors. In a word, the streets of any ancient city after sundown were a perfect setting for the committing of deeds of violence without fear of detection.

It was very late when Nephi came upon Laban (1 Nephi 4:5, 22); the streets were deserted and dark. Let the reader imagine what he would do if he were on patrol near enemy headquarters during a blackout and stumbled on the unconscious form of some notoriously bloodthirsty enemy general. By the brutal code of war the foe has no claim to a formal trial, and it is now or never. Laban was wearing armor, so the only chance of dispatching him quickly, painlessly, and safely was to cut off his head--the conventional treatment of criminals in the East, where beheading has always been by the sword, and where an executioner would be fined for failing to decapitate his victim at one clean stroke. Nephi drew the sharp, heavy weapon and stood over Laban for a long time, debating his course (1 Nephi 4:9-18). He was an expert hunter and a powerful man: with due care such a one could do a quick and efficient job and avoid getting much blood on himself. But why should he worry about that? There was not one chance in a thousand of meeting any honest citizen, and in the dark no one would notice the blood anyway. What they would notice would be the armor that Nephi put on, and which, like the sword, could easily be wiped clean. The donning of the armor was the natural and the shrewd thing for Nephi to do. A number of instances from the last war could be cited to show that a spy in the enemy camp is never so safe as when he is wearing the insignia of a high military official--provided he does not hang around too long, and Nephi had no intention of doing that. No one dares challenge big brass too closely (least of all a grim and hot-tempered Laban); their business is at all times "top secret," and their uniform gives them complete freedom to come and to go unquestioned.

Nephi tells us that he was "led by the Spirit" (1 Nephi 4:6). He was not taking impossible chances, but being in a tight place he followed the surest formula of those who have successfully carried off ticklish assignments. His audacity and speed were rewarded, and he was clear of the town before anything was discovered. In his whole exploit there is nothing in the least improbable.

How Nephi disguised himself in the clothes of Laban and tricked Laban's servant into admitting him to the treasury is an authentic bit of Oriental romance, and of history as well. One need but think of Sir Richard Burton's amazingly audacious masquerades in the East, carried on in broad daylight and for months on end with perfect success, to realize that such a thing is entirely possible. When Zoram, the servant, discovered that it was not his master with whom he had been discussing the highly secret doings of the elders as they walked to the outskirts of the city, he was seized with terror, as well he might be. In such a situation there was only one thing Nephi could possibly have done, both to spare Zoram and to avoid giving alarm--and no westerner could have guessed what it was. Nephi, a powerful fellow, held the terrified Zoram in a vice-like grip long enough to swear a solemn oath in his ear, "as the Lord liveth, and as I live" (1 Nephi 4:32), that he would not harm him if he would listen. Zoram immediately relaxed, and Nephi swore another oath to him that he would be a free man if he would join the party: "Therefore, if thou wilt go down into the wilderness to my father thou shalt have place with us" (1 Nephi 4:34).

We have already considered the correctness of the expressions "go down," and "have place," as well as the necessity of having Zoram address himself to no one but Nephi's father. What astonishes the western reader is the miraculous effect of Nephi's oath on Zoram, who upon hearing a few conventional words promptly becomes tractable, while as for the brothers, as soon as Zoram "made an oath unto us . . . that he would tarry with us from that time forth . . . our fears did cease concerning him" (1 Nephi 4:35, 37).

The reaction of both parties makes sense when one realizes that the oath is the one thing that is most sacred and inviolable among the desert people: "Hardly will an Arab break this oath, even if his life be in jeopardy," for "there is nothing stronger, and nothing more sacred than the oath among the nomads," and even among the city Arabs, if it be exacted under special conditions. But not every oath will do: to be most binding and solemn an oath should be by the life of something, even if it be but a blade of grass; the only oath more awful than "by my life" or (less commonly) "by the life of my head," is the wa hayat Allah, "by the life of God," or "as the Lord liveth," the Arabic equivalent of the ancient Hebrew hai Elohim. Today it is glibly employed by the city riffraff, but anciently it was an awful thing, as it still is among the desert people: "I confirmed my answer in the Beduin wise," says Doughty. "By his life . . . he said, . . . `Well, swear by the life of Ullah (God)!' . . . I answered, . . . and thus even the nomads use, in a greater occasion, but they say, By the life of thee, in a little matter." So we see that the one and only way that Nephi could have pacified the struggling Zoram in an instant was to utter the one oath that no man would dream of breaking, the most solemn of all oaths to the Semite: "as the Lord liveth, and as I live" (1 Nephi 4:32).

Another angle of approach which Nibley has taken is worth reading as well:

(Hugh Nibley, Teachings of the Book of Mormon, Semester 1, p.160)

Here's Laban dead drunk in the street, a disgusting figure. But you are hardly going to attack a sleeping man. As we are told in the ballad of Clerk Sunders, "For shame to slay a sleeping man." We don't do that sort of thing. He didn't want to do that either, but he was "constrained by the Spirit." He had the impulse to kill Laban. "…but I said in my heart: Never at any time have I shed the blood of man." That's the first thing. He wouldn't do it because that's the first rule: "For the Lord…neither doth he will that man should shed blood, but in all things hath forbidden it, from the beginning of man," as we read in Ether 8:19. So he shrunk and wouldn't do it. That means he was sick at his stomach. He wasn't going to do it at all. "And the Spirit said unto me again: Behold [notice the next reason] the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands…" (This is your chance.) Like other high military officials in our time, Nazi criminals, etc., Laban was a murderer. Nephi knew he was a murderer and a lawless man because he had robbed them. He was a thief. He made them a promise. When they went to deal, he chased them out, tried to kill them, and took all they left with him. That was the end of the deal. That's the sort of a person he was dealing with, so he thought of that as a pretty good reason. Then there's another reason: "…Yea, and I also knew that he had sought to take away mine own life; yea, and he would not hearken unto the commandments of the Lord [another argument]; and he also had taken away our property." (1 Nephi 4:11.)

Well, it's about time. No, he still won't do it. Then verse 12: "And it came to pass that the Spirit said unto me again [after all this holding back]: Slay him, for the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands [then another argument]; Behold the Lord slayeth the wicked to bring forth his righteous purposes. It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief." (You've got to get that record.) "And now, when I, Nephi, had heard these words, I remembered the words of the Lord which he spake unto me in the wilderness, saying that: Inasmuch as thy seed shall keep my commandments [So it's the commandments. This is a special order, you see. This isn't just an impulse and a chance. He wouldn't be justified in doing this on his own, but now he gets a special order], they shall prosper in the land of promise [another argument]. Yea, and I also thought that they could not keep the commandments of the Lord according to the law of Moses, save they should have the law. And I also knew that the law was engraven upon [p.161] the plates of brass [he wouldn't get them otherwise]. And again, I knew that the Lord had delivered Laban into my hands for this cause [it had a definite purpose; this has taken thirteen steps to convince him that he had better go ahead with it]—that I might obtain the records according to his commandments. Therefore I did obey the voice of the Spirit…" Well, he was a skilled hunter, as you know, with a bow. When he was in the mountains there, he was pretty good. But after an agony of debate, he finally did it.

So, all in all, this problem in the Book of Mormon is not such a large nor impossible occurance at all. Br. Clif, I believe, has jumped to an unjustified hasty conclusion against the Book of Mormon.